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NAMING AND BLAMING: THE CASE OF

"THE REHNQUIST COURT"
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.

Nancy Maveety. Queen's Court: Judicial Power in the Rehnquist Era. Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 2008. ix + 194 pp. Notes, bibliography, and index.
$29.95.

Using the names of chief justices to demarcate periods in the history of the
United States Supreme Court is as common as it is misleading. The label "War-

ren Court" seems etched in stone, for example, even though the Court went
through two, if not three, quite distinct phases between 1953 and 1969 when

the eponymous Earl Warren was chief. The last phase, moreover, arguably
continued for almost a decade after Warren left the bench, and might - at least
after the early 1960s - have more accurately been termed the "Brennan Court."

Applying the chief justice's name to the recently terminated "Rehnquist Court"
is particularly inapt, Professor Nancy Maveety argues in her new book, Queen's
Court, a title that readily captures her thesis. Seeking "to assign a definitive

meaning to the 'Rehnquist Court'" and "identify its historical importance,"
Maveety concludes that the Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist
"should be remembered legitimately as Justice O'Connor's." Both its longterm significance and the "real difficulties - jurisprudential and systemic"
that it created - flowed from the "judicial O'Connorism" that characterized
its work (p. 4).

A specialist in the Court's history and the author of Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor: Strategist on the Supreme Court (1996), Maveety is well positioned
to evaluate the contributions of the Court's first female member during her
twenty-five-year tenure from 1981 to 2006. Few, of course, would dispute the
author's general premise that O'Connor "sat, figuratively if not literally," at
the center of the Rehnquist Court (p. 4). Indeed, her pivotal role has long been
recognized. Edward Lazarus, who clerked for Justice Harry Blackmun in the late
1980s, concluded a decade later that the Court "remains, as it was in my day,
a creature of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy." The two "swing" conservatives

controlled. "In case after case," Lazarus explained, "these swing-vote justices
write separate concurrences, usually modulating the conservative insurgency,
Reviews in American History 37 (2009) 440-445 © 2009 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
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but always bending the Court and the law to their will."1 Subsequ
veying O'Connor's tenure after her retirement, Jeffrey Toobin p

position similarly if more dramatically. "The way to win a m

Rehnquist Court was to earn O'Connor's support," he wrote, "so h

invariably came to her as supplicants."2 Thus, the importanc
book lies neither in its identification of O'Connor's pivotal p

Rehnquist Court nor in its description of her "as a centrist conse
sharply divided and jurisprudentially polarized Supreme Court" (p
its importance lies in its more specific argument that O'Connor u
position not just to swing cases her way but also to reshape the C
workings. Largely assuming, rather than examining, issues of pol
judicial values, and substantive doctrine, Maveety concentrates on
evolving institutional norms and defacto decision-making process

those areas that she locates O'Connor's principal significance.

"the crucial contributor to each of the several legacies of the Sup
during the Rehnquist era" she concludes, and the Rehnquist Co
legacy was its normative and behavioral acceptance of a distin
O'Connorism" (p. 4, italics in original).
Queen's Court builds its argument in a series of steps. Chapt
largely on the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun covering three
(1986, 1991, and 1993), argues that "individuated judicial behavior
Rehnquist Court" (p. 5). The chief ran a "nondeliberative conf
that fostered a norm of "judicial individualism" (p. 35) as wel
of informal bargaining in which the justices strove to pull togeth
coalitions to support specific results in individual cases. "O'Co
colleagues," Maveety explains, "behaved as if the circulation of co
memos and concurrence drafts was the duty of all justices in the
performance of policy leadership exertion" (p. 33). Efforts to
policy leadership were widely dispersed, with the chief participat
dominating and the associate justices - with the partial exception
two staunchest conservatives, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Tho
personal influence through accommodation and compromise. T

role of that informal bargaining process, and the personal dynami
the varied relations among the justices - especially Scalia' s "coalit

behavior (p. 36) - prevented the formation of a cohesive and cons
vative majority and thereby created the institutional conditions t

O'Connor to move into her central and often decisive position

Chapter two examines the "emerging predominance of separate

opinions," a development that Maveety terms "multivocality"

as the defining characteristic of a new kind of "choral Court." Th

use of concurrences, and the increased number of justices wh
"enhanced the authority of individual justices to promulgate
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reflected the Court's animating "judicial individualism" (p. 40)

izing the new "choral Court/7 Maveety maintains, O'Conn

critical. She "established that concurrence could be constitutiv

in determining the law (as her separate opinions addressi
the Establishment Clause surely demonstrated), and she hel

legitimacy of the concurrence in the Court's institutional nor

The emergence of a "choral Court," Maveety declares, was
most significant of any legacy - doctrinal or behavioral - the

leaves" (p. 38).
Chapter three turns to the Court's substantive jurisprud

closely on thirteen of the "most important" cases the Rehnqu
a plausible if inevitably debatable selection.3 Examining tho

highlights O'Connor's role in establishing the "Rehnquist C

individualist' conception of judicial power" (p. 61). That judicia

led to a distinctive and pluralistic "associates' justice," a "ca
jurisprudential pragmatism that occurred as individual asso

for influence from the center and with one another." Its ultim
the Court's "lack of an overarching ideological unity" - was a
"contextual-factor, reasonableness-based balancing," (p. 61) a "r

doctrinal approach" that "became the predominant judicial
a majority of the Rehnquist associates" (p. 102). The approa

"a judicial procedural commitment to the idea of the Court as
determined to record their various individual views, yet coope
accede reciprocity in doing so." Those characteristics composed

Court made manifest" (p. 103).

Chapters four and five shift the book's focus to a considera
in which the Rehnquist Court led commentators to question
views about the Court and its proper role. Bypassing some of
changes, Maveety zeroes in on the creation of a "judicial m
O'Connor and her jurisprudence (p. 125). Increasingly pictu
moderate, and minimalist, O'Connor became "the contemporar
for a judge" (p. 126). Although the two chapters are relativ
analysis of the many debates the Rehnquist Court inspired, th
make the fair point that many commentators shaped their in
O'Connor and her jurisprudence far more in the hope of contr
of the Court than in any effort to understand her actual judi
significance. Rejecting the O'Connor "mythology," Maveety
justice was in fact a major force shaping the Rehnquist C
and insistent "juricentrism." The Court's restless, assertiv
pressing judicial activism was "essentially indistinguishable fr
jurisprudence, except perhaps in terms of tone" (p. 115).
legacy, Maveety declares, was a demonstration not of the v
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restraint but of "the power that lies in judicial pragmatism
she suggests, "the real legacy of O'Connor-style jurisprud
cloaked as humility" (p. 9).

Thus, Maveety indicts the judicial O'Connorism she identifie
center stage. Although the pragmatism and moderation of jud

seemed to make it widely acceptable to both scholars and t

thor explains, its particularistic and even ad hoc method - an

individualism it nourished - created profound institutio
problems. One was the influence that it exerted on the fed
whole, where it empowered lower court judges to go thei
ways and fostered "a declining norm of consensus" (p. 1
its de facto challenge to the idea of a "rule of law." As the low
"handed doctrine difficult to understand and impossible to ap
compelled "to resort to O'Connoresque" techniques themselves
undermining the law's predictability, expanding areas of l
and spurring repeated litigations over essentially the sam
problem, "the real detrimental impact of O'Connor-style judi
was the fact that its ostensible "restraint" was "fundame
In reality, O'Connoresque jurisprudence did not minimize
power but rather "extended judicial influence and policy d
While O'Connor and "her" Court hewed to a relatively modera
leaning path, her jurisprudence posed serious dangers for
balancing approaches and empowered pragmatic judicial plu
be put to work for more ambitious, less conciliatory accompl
then, disconcertingly, rendered hard to criticize in terms of
methods or ends. O'Connorism's wrapping dresses as it con
of judicial power" (p. 155).
Thus, the "true risk" of judicial O'Connorism was its unprin
ism, the abandonment of "any notion that legal principle gov
judging" (p. 156). The "greatest danger and the most wor
the 'model justice' as a judicial guide," Maveety warns, is
to judicial power without frankly acknowledging it as s
comfort and cover where none should exist for unaccoun
unwarranted judicial decision making" (p. 155).
In its ultimate conclusion, then, Queen's Court brings us fa
again with the central and long-recognized intellectual cha
American constitutionalism: the problem of judicial "subjectiv
lationship to fundamental ideas about constitutionalism an
Maveety's critique of O'Connoresque jurisprudence seems
skepticism about some of the correctives that have been s
minimalism, bright-line doctrinalism, and "popular" constitu
equally warranted. Not surprisingly, Queen's Court offers no
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resolve the difficulty it underscores except, possibly, a faint
gestion that greater candor about judicial values and more det
to articulate rules - however narrow - might impose some
such a suggestion - if, indeed, the author actually intends to o
unlikely to carry us far. Maveety can, however, hardly be bla
to resolve such a fundamental problem, even if it is the centr
book highlights.
While its analysis of the Rehnquist Court's inner workings i
its warning about the dangers of an ad hoc pragmatic constitu
Queen's Court is less satisfactory in its truncated and largely
of the broader historical forces that led to the emergence of

The author acknowledges that O'Connor consciously follow

of Justices John M. Harlan the younger and Lewis F. Powell i

rences to shape and sometimes control the law, for examp

little to explore the more general and longer-term forces that
reshaped the Court's institutional norms and fostered its new
Throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1930s, unani

Court's decisions were extremely high, often reaching 90 p
as late as the 1920s the justices exhibited a strong preferen
and, in order to make Court decisions unanimous, frequen
judgments they doubted or opposed.5 Thus, it was only in the
New Deal that the Court's decisions commonly became frag
rate individual opinions, increasingly concurrences as well
both more recently coming in multiples.6 Many developments
spread of legal realist assumptions, the increasingly heterogen
American society, and the appearance of new and especiall
and moral issues on the Court's docket - contributed to th
Queen's Court recognizes the importance of such broader histo
it consigns them to the periphery of its analysis. Instead, con
narrow contemporary and institutional focus, it stresses the p
of the sitting justices: O'Connor's combination of pragmatism
Stephen Breyer's ingrained problem-solving orientation, Jo
faith in the value of honestly stated differences, the relat
of Scalia and Thomas to bargain, and the inability of the ch
power of his realm" (p. 151).
Similarly, largely assuming rather than examining the s
conflicts that divided the Rehnquist justices, Queen's Court
the jurisprudential problem obverse to the one it identifies. If
pragmatism has its dangers, so too do ostensibly "principled"
are, in fact, generated and contoured by the demands of polit
sweeping textualism or originalism that purports to prov
"correct" answers to contemporary legal problems, for examp
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American constitutionalism as much as does the pragmatism o

erates. Given the dangers of such ideologically based " cert
be useful to reconsider Maveety's seemingly implicit sugge
judicial candor about the role of personal values in decisio
make a useful, if necessarily limited, contribution to America
jurisprudence.
Ironically, given Maveety's concerns, Queen's Court also
quality of judicial O'Connorism. Its pragmatic accommodationi
well undermine "rule of law" ideas, was in some part inspi
exhibit doctrinal continuity, reaffirm the role of precedent,
extent to which the values of Republican judicial appointees w
nation's constitutional law. Judicial O'Connorism, in other wo

seen as a determined effort to maintain the image of an object

"rule of law" in the face of political change and ideological pr

"true" nature seems somewhat more complex than Maveet
Queen's Court is a thoughtful and illuminating book; and

what it set out to do, exploring the ways in which the Rehnq
its most famous swing justice - shaped the Court's internal n

behavior. Maveety has identified important changes in th
and practices, thoughtfully challenged the claim that O'C
a judicial "gold standard," and illuminated from a new per
damental jurisprudential problem that lies at the heart of
constitutionalism.
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